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Abstract
This paper examines the Japanese automobile industry to measure the eect of im-
port restriction policy for infant industry. Import restriction policy can provide large
amount of domestic demand for producers and help them to acquire the experience of
production. It has been said to be a key driving force of the dramatic growth of the
Japanese automobile industry. Compared with a subsidy policy, however, an import
restriction causes some types of distortions. Conducting the counterfactual exercise, I
explore what it would have happened if instead the optimal subsidy had been provided to
Japanese automakers. This exercise measures the welfare eect of an actual restriction
policy in terms of an optimal one. That is, it quanties how close the welfare level of
the actual policy was to the level of the optimal subsidy policy. From the experimental
exercise, I nd the fact that the import restriction reached to only 55 percent of the
optimal welfare level.
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21 Introduction
The Japanese automobile industry has been the icon of Japan's dramatic economic success
since the end of the Second World War. In the last half of the century Japanese automakers
have experienced an explosive growth and gained global recognition. The success of Japanese
automakers has been drawing a great attention from many developing countries, and policy
makers of these countries have been seeking the reason for this unprecedent success.
It has been said that governmental intervention was a driving force of the growth of the
Japanese automobile industry. To protect domestic automakers, the Japanese government
restricted import cars and also imposed taris heavily on them just after the Second World
War. Particularly, during 1954-1965, a severe import restriction on the passenger's vehicle
was applied. Under this protection, Japanese automakers have acquired the experience of
producing passenger's cars and by the end of protection, they became competitive enough
against foreign counterparts.
On the other hand, import restriction and tari are not a welfare maximizing policy.
Without any obstacles, some production subsidy policies are theoretically more desirable
than any other policies. In fact, however, due to budgetary and political diculties, pro-
duction subsidy policy is rarely taken. Certainly, the Japanese government faced these
constraints and they couldn't implement an optimal production subsidy policy (in terms of
welfare) at that time.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the protection policy for the Japanese automo-
bile industry, comparing it against an optimal policy. Melitz(2005) shows that without any
constraint an optimal protection policy for an infant industry is a '
exible' subsidy policy. A
'
exible' subsidy policy means that a policy maker can choose a subsidy level in response to
the marginal cost reduction. The experimental analysis presents the counterfactual environ-
ment where the Japanese government could choose the optimal subsidy policy without any
3constraint. That is, in the experiment Japanese automobile makers compete against foreign
makers with a subsidy. Conducting the counterfactual exercise, I explore what it would have
happened to the Japanese automobile industry if the optimal policy had been implemented.
The exercise measures how close the welfare level of the actual policy was to the level of the
optimal policy.
The automobile industry has been at the center of the interest of policy makers all over
the world. Particular, not a few countries have been trying to push up the automobile
industry in the half of the century. Most of these countries used the protection policy as
instruments leading their automakers to the growth as Japan experienced. In this paper
I present ndings relating to the economic welfare and industry growth, to analyze the
experience of the Japanese automobile industry in 1954-1965.
The paper is organized as follows; section 2 gives an overview of the policy implemented
for the automobile industry. Just after the Second World War, the Japanese government
started their protection policy for the automobile industry. The aim of the Japanese gov-
ernment was to protect domestic passenger's cars. Particularly, during 1954-1965, a severe
import restriction was implemented. This severe restriction was considered the key factor of
the growth of the Japanese automobile industry. In that period, substantially Japanese mar-
ket was closed against foreign competitors. Section 3 and section 4 present the estimation
method of the demand and supply system. Following the recent literature on the demand
estimation, I estimate demand parameters using random coecient logit framework(Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes(1995)). Random coecient logit can avoid the problem of unrealistic
own- and cross- elasticity and unreasonable substitution patterns. Therefore, I can get more
precise and reliable demand estimates than other alternatives. Cost side parameters are ob-
tained without the detail cost data by utilizing demand parameter estimates and assuming
the type of competition of the market. Section 5 conducts the counterfactual exercise to eval-
4uate the policy for the automobile industry at that time. With demand and supply estimates,
I create the counterfactual environment where the Japanese government could choose the
optimal production subsidy policy and therefore Japanese makers faced competition against
foreign counterparts with this subsidy. For the optimal environment as a benchmark, the
counterfactual exercise enables me to analyze the outcome of the actual protection policy. It
demonstrates that the Japanese protection policy achieved about fty percent of the welfare
level obtained by the optimal policy. Further it reveals that consumers gained less under the
actual policy, relative to automobile producers.
2 The Japanese Automobile Industry in 1950-1965
The Japanese government started its protection policy for the automobile industry in 19501.
The main aim of this protection policy was the protection of domestic passenger's vehicles.
Although only tari was used as an instrument during the early period of the policy, in
response to a surge of import cars in 1952-1953, the Japanese government decided to re-
strict import passenger's cars severely. This restriction substantially prohibited Japanese
consumers to purchase import cars until 19652.
At that time, Japanese passenger's cars were far behind import cars in price and quality.
Therefore, if no protection policy had been applied, the Japanese makers would have faced
the tough competition against foreign makers in the passenger's car market and couldn't
have survived. That is, due to a protection by import restriction, Japanese makers caught
up quickly their potential competitors by the end of the protection.
Clearly this import restriction policy was a key driving force leading the Japanese au-
1Other industries, e.g. steel, textile and chemical, were protected by the same policy.
2There were a few exceptions. Taxi, hotel and broadcasting companies were allowed to buy import cars.
Further, foreigners living in Japan also could purchase imports. During a protection period, sales quantities
of imports were at most 2000 vehicles per year. Therefore, I exclude import vehicles from the demand and
supply estimation in the next section
5tomobile industry to the dramatic growth3. Therefore this paper focuses on the analysis
of the eect of this severe import restriction policy on the passenger's car market during
1954-19654.
3 Demand Estimation
This section explains the model of demand for automobiles used in this study. Following the
recently developed techniques of estimating the demand, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
or Nevo(2000), I use the random utility discrete choice model of consumer behavior.
In this study, demand for automobiles are estimated at the product level, controlling for
the imortant characteristics of automobile. Since the purchasing behavior of individuals and
their individual characteristics can not be observed, I aggregate individuals to obtain the
demand for automobile, while still allowing for heterogeniety across consumers.
3.1 Random Utility Model
Demand system in this study is obtained by aggregating a discrete choice model of individual
consumer behavior. Because I don't have the data that match consumer characteristics to the
automobile those consumers purchased, I have to rely on the product level data to estimate
all of the parameters of the demand system.
The level of utility of individual consumer i from purchasing automobile j at year t
is a function of observable characteristics, xjt, unobserved characteristics, jt, and price,
pjt. In addition, the utility depends on consumer characteristics, demographics (income) D,
consumers preference v, and idiosyncratic error . Thus, the utility derived by consumer i
3Using demand and supply parameters obtained in later sections, I conduct the experiment where the
Japanese makers were not protected by any policy. The experiment shows that because prices of the Japanese
cars were signicantly higher to imports, demand for the Japanese were just about zero. This result indicates
the Japanese automakers would not have survived without any protection.
4The data limitation prevents me to know the situation in 1954. Further, I exclude large class passenger's
vehicle (over 2000cc) from my analysis. The reason is that demand for cars in this class was extremely low
in that period.
6from purchasing product j at t is given as
uijt(Dit;vit;it;pjt;xjt;jt;)
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. This utility specication implies that
consumers with dierent individual characteristics D;v; make the dierent choices.
Following the literature on the traditional discrete choice model, I assume consumers buy
one unit of automobile at year t, which gives the highest utility. That is, consumer i chooses
product j at t if and only if
uijt(Dit;vit;it;pjt;xjt;jt;)  uikt(Dit;vit;it;pkt;xkt;kt;)
k = 0;1;:::;J:
This implicitly denes the set of unobserved variables, vi, ij, that lead to the choice of
product j at t.
This set can be written as
Ajt = (Dit;vit;itjuijt  uikt k = 0;1;:::;J):
The set Ajt denes the consumers who choose automobile j at year t. Here, I assume ties
cannot occur. Then, given this assumption, the market share of the car j at t is just a
multi-dimensional integral over the mass of consumers region. Thus the market share of
automobile j is described as
sjt(pjt;xjt;jt) =
Z
Ajt
dP(D;v;)
=
Z
Ajt
dP(jD)dP(vjD)dP(D)
=
Z
Ajt
dP()dP(v)dP(D); (1)
where P(D;v;) denotes the population distribution functions.
Given assumptions on the distribution of the consumer characteristics, the equation (1)
can be computed analytically or numerically. Therefore, for a given set of parameters, the
7market share of automobile j at year t is obtained from the equation (1) as a function of its
observable and unobservable characteristics, prices and unknown parameters to be estimated.
3.2 Random Coecient Logit Model
Without any assumption on the distribution of consumer characteristics, it is hard to com-
pute the multi-dimensional integral in the equation (1). Therefore, in order to obtain the
share of automobile j at t, assumptions on the distribution of consumer characteristics are
made. At the same time, those assumptions have important implications for the own- and
cross-price elasticities of demand.
The simplest assumption on the distribution of consumer characteristics in the equation
(1) is that consumer characteristics are common to all of the consumers. When this assump-
tion is made, the distributions of consumer characteristics are degenerate. Then the share
of automobile j at t becomes
sjt(p;x;;) =
Z
Ajt
dP();
where only , random shock, is indicating consumer heterogeniety. Once I assume  follows
i.i.d type I extreme-value distribution, the share of automobile j is expressed as a succinct
closed model. It is a simple logit model. However, a simple logit is appealing to its tractabil-
ity, it shows the unrealistic own- and cross-price elasticities and substitution patterns.
Therefore, a more 
exible model, which is able to deal with the interaction between
consumer heterogeniety and product characteristics, is needed.
The indirect utility function is specied as the below
uijt = log(yit   pjt) + xjt + jt +
X
k
kviktxjk + ijt: (2)
In this utility specication, I allowing for the consumer characteristics to interact with the
characteristics of automobile 5. This interaction can mitigate the unrealistic prediction of
5I also use the rst order approximation to the utility function (2), like Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999).
8own and cross elasticities and substitution patterns. The specication of demand system
is completed with the introduction of an outside option; the consumer does not choose the
passengers car. Without an outside option, an overall price increase of all of the passengers
car does not aect quantities purchased. The utility from outside option is
ui0 = log(yi) + 0 + 0vi0 + "i0:
Once again, I assume the distribution of  is i.i.d type I extreme-value, then the share of
the automobile j at t is expressed by
sjt(p;x;;)
=
Z elog(yit pjt)+xjt+jt+
P
k kviktxjk
PJ
j=0 elog(yit pjt)+xjt+jt+
P
k kviktxjk
dP(D)dP(v)
=
Z ejt+jt(p;x;y;v;;)
PJ
j=0 ejt+jt(p;x;y;v;;)dP(D)dP(v); (3)
where P(D) and P(v) are the empirical and parametric population distribution functions
respectively6. I use the information of the income distribution form population survey and
estimate the mean and variance as a consumer characteristics distribution D. Further, I
assume the consumer heterogenous preference, v, is the normal distribution with mean zero
and its variance one7.
In this approximation, price sensitivity is modeled as
i =

yi
where  is a parameter to be estimated. I use i to calculate individual consumer welfare in the later section.
6In the simple logit case, the predicted share is given by
sjt =
e
xjt pjt+
PJ
j=0 exjt pjt+ : (4)
7To calculate the predicted market share, I approximate the equation (3) by
sjt(p;x;;) =
1
ns
ns X
i=1
e
jt+(p;x;y;v;;)
PJ
j=0 ejt+(p;x;y;v;;);
where y=(y1;:::;yns) and vk = (v1;:::;vns);k = 1;:::;Kare ns random draws form the empirical distribution
of P(D) and the parametric distribution of P(v).
93.3 Estimation and Instruments
A straightforward approach to estimate the equation (3) is to minimize the distance between
the observed market share and the predicted share. But usually that approach is not taken.
Price is likely to be correlated with unobservable characteristics, , known to consumers and
producers. Due to this correlation between price and unobservable characteristics, endogeni-
ety problem arises in a straightforward estimation. Ignoring this endogeniety between price
and unobservable characteristics, coecient of price will be estimated upwardly.
To the best of my knowledge, there are two ways to solve this endogeniety problem in
discrete choice framework. Berry (1994) developed the method of transforming an equation
to linear form and enabled us to estimate parameters to use the traditional instrumental
variable method (or Generalized Method of Moment). On the other hand, Petrin and Train
(2005) solved endogeniety, using a control function as a proxy for unobserved characteristics.
In this study, I use Berry's method to transform an equation to linear form to extract 8.
Following Berry (1994), the simple logit model of the equation (4) can be transformed
analytically
jt = ln(sjt)   ln(s0)   (xjt   pjt)
where s0 is the share of outside option. Once an equation be changed the linear form, I can
conduct IV estimation or GMM estimation in the usual manner.
In a random coecient logit case, I use a contraction mapping theorem to extract the
unobservable characteristics  (See Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes(1995)).
jt(st;;) = jt(st;;)   xjt (5)
where  enters in a linear fashion on the other hand ,  enter non-linearly. Treating the
8Strong assumptions are required to obtain a control function in my case where the number of products
is large relative to the number of year (or market).
10Table 1: The result of the demand estimation
demand parameters variables coecients std. error
Means('s) Const -5.483 1.021
Size 0.1885 0.1210
HP/W -0.0152 0.0158
CC 0.1451 0.0761
Std. deviations ('s) Const 0.4932 0.0571
Size 0.0424 0.0012
HP/W 0.0534 0.0671
CC 0.0327 0.0397
Term on price log(y   p) 3.9787 0.9662
Maker and year dummies are also included, but not reported.
Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping.
unobservable characteristics as a error term, I set the moment condition,
E[Zjt] = 0 (6)
where Z is instruments. I nd instruments by using approximation to the optimal instru-
ments discussed in Pakes(1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes(1995). The characteristics
of own product, the sum of the chracteristics across other own-rm products and the sum of
the characteristics across other rms are used instruments. With these instruments I con-
duct non-linear GMM to estimate demand parameters. The parameter estimates are shown
in Table 1. Constant term indicates the utility dierence from outside goods. Coecients
show reasonable value and sign except HP/W's. But, coecient of HP/W is not signi-
cant. Standard deviations indicates that consumers shared relatively same preferences for
characteristics among them.
4 Supply Estimation
Unfortunately, It is hard to obtain the cost side data for each model. Therefore, by assuming
the type of competition in Japanese automobile market and utilizing demand parameters, I
11estimate supply side parameters.
Firm f's prot function at year t is
ft =
X
j2F
(pjt   mcjt)Msjt(p;x;;)   Cf
where M is the potential market size and sjt(p) is the predicted share of automobile j at t
from demand estimates.
Japanese auto makers are assumed to compete with each other in Bertrand-Nash fashion.
That is, each rm set prices that maximize its prot given the characteristics of its own rm's
products, and the prices and the characteristics of other competing rms products.
There are J (the number of products ) rst order conditions for static price setting
competition.
sjt(p;x;;) +
X
r2Jf
(pr   mcr)
@sr(p;x;;)
@pj
= 0 for j = 1;:::;J;
where the rm f is setting the price considering other product across own rm's products.
I assume makers have a marginal cost function that is a log-linear in the cost character-
istics. Similar to the demand system, I assume that the cost characteristics are divided into
two components ,the observable characteristics, ! and the unobservable characteristics .
Given these assumptions, the marginal cost function can be written
log(mcjt) = 
!jt + jt; (7)
where mcjt is an estimate obtained from the demand side parameters and the assumption the
type of competition as previously described, and 
 is cost side parameters to be estimated.
The characteristics of automobile are the same as in the demand system. Year and maker
dummies are also included as in the demand estimation. In addtion, I include the cumulative
output level, because I want the marginal costs to fall in response to the increase in output.
This downward sloping supply curve plays a critical role in later analyses.
12Table 2: The result of the supply estimation
cost parameters variables estimates std. error
Const -3.0181 0.6129
Size 0.97407 0.3942
HP/W -0.9114 0.186
CC 1.9978 0.3043
Cumulative Output -0.15178 0.0269
Maker and year dummies are included, but not reported.
Concerning the correlation between these and unobserved characteristics , the instru-
mental variables are used. The moment condition is given as
E[Zjt] = 0 (8)
where Z includes the same instruments as used in demand estimation.
The results of supply estimation are shown at Table 2. An unexpected sign of HP/W'
coecient is obtained, but it is not signicant. Coecient of cumulative output of the model
indicates the marginal cost falls in response to the output level.
5 Counterfactual Exercise
It has been said that the Japanese automobile industry is the prominent example of a success
of infant industry protection. The Japanese government severely restricted imports and,
further, it imposed taris on them until 1965. Under that protection, Japanese automakers
could acquire the adequate experience of production and as learning-by-doing they constantly
reduced their production costs and prices in turn. By the end of protection, Japanese makers
became competitive enough against foreign counterparts.
However, theoretically quota and tari are inferior to a production subsidy policy. They
cause the distortion on consumption side, creating a wedge between the marginal cost of the
foreign good and domestic marginal cost. Therefore, the Japanese protection policy must
13have induced some distortions on the consumption side. I measure how big the distortion
along with the policy was. I also check how producers were aected by policy.
In this section, I conduct the counterfactual exercise to explore what would have hap-
pened to the industry growth and welfare, if the optimal protection policy had been taken for
the protection period, 1955-1965. Comparing the level of welfare attained under the coun-
terfactual policy with what it was attained in the actual policy, I evaluate how the Japanese
protection policy was close to the optimal protection policy.
5.1 The Optimal Protection Policy
The Japanese government used severe import restriction and tari to protect domestic au-
tomakers. However, import restriction is not the best way to protect the domestic infant
industry. There are alternatives which would induce better consequences. For example,
domestic production subsidy clearly is the better alternative than a quota or tari. Melitz
(2005) shows that if a government planner could choose his protection policy without any
constraints, the optimal policy to protect the domestic infant industry is a 
exible produc-
tion subsidy. A '
exible' subsidy means that a policy maker can change the subsidy level
in response to the marginal cost reduction. That is, the optimal production subsidy level
at each year is determined by the dierence between current marginal cost and its long-run
level,
t = c(Qt)    c;
where Qt is the cumulative production. Long-run level  c is the marginal cost level which is
attained once the infant industry becomes mature.
Although a 
exible subsidy is an ideal tool for the infant industry protection, it is hard to
be implemented. Budgetary or political constraints will prevent planners from utilizing that
policy. Even without budgetary and political constraints, to give the production subsidy
14appropriately, they must have the information on marginal costs, which are not observable
as usual. Due to these diculties, this rst best protection policy is rarely taken.
5.2 Counterfactual Scenario
In this section, the experimental analysis on the governmental intervention is conducted,
leaving (domestic and foreign) automakers product mix unchanged9. I assume that the
Japanese government could implement the 
exible subsidy policy without any constraint at
that time10. As Melitz (2005) says, it is the rst best protection policy, which is maximizing
a social welfare. In this experiment, I explore what would have happened to the industry
growth and social welfare if the optimal production subsidy had been implemented instead
of the import restriction. Comparing the dierence of the welfare level between under the
counterfactual environment and under the actual environment, I evaluate the protection
policy for automobile industry.
To conduct the experiment under the counterfactual scenario, the long-run marginal cost
level,  c is needed. According to Automobile Year Book, the production level of 120000
vehicles per year was required to compete with foreign counterparts equally. Based on this
information, I assume the makers have achieved this level of production. That is, they nish
their learning periods and can produce their products at the long-run marginal cost,  c 11.
They had produced the cumulative output of about 240000 vehicles until they reached to the
production level of 120000 vehicles per year. That is, it means that the Japanese makers could
attain the ecient marginal cost level when they have experienced the cumulative output of
9In the exercise, I ignore the eect of the counterfactual policy on the automaker's decision process. The
dierent policy would have aected the maker's decision and changed the number of domestic or foreign
makers and the number of automobiles in the market. While it would be interesting to consider the change
of decision processes, I leave this problem to the future research and, assuming it constant, conduct the
experimental analysis.
10In fact, the scal condition at that time would prevent the Japanese government to use the production
subsidy policy. In this simulation exercise, without concerning the feasibility, the policy maker is assumed to
choose any policy
11By 1965, only two makers, Toyota and Nissan, have reached to the production level of 120000 vehicles
per year.
15Table 3: Actual Policy versus Counterfactual Policy(price unit 10000 yen)
actual counterfactual
year price sales price domestic sales import sales
1955 9.7233 8519 7.345 11379 8347.5
1956 9.0346 19075 6.3103 28638 13678
1957 7.8949 33902 6.4142 49202 17780
1958 7.4353 42822 5.1203 78219 18506
1959 8.0536 65282 5.8339 121310 26228
1960 6.3256 141099 4.3844 224540 32796
1961 5.2947 224297 3.8528 363070 45403
1962 4.8423 248858 3.9483 548110 52636
1963 4.4453 334243 4.0395 702510 66471
1964 4.3869 469660 3.9073 943700 93927
1965 4.285 568914 4.2093 1169700 114290
240000 vehicles. Therefore, I substitute the cumulative output into 240000 vehicles in each
model to calculate the long-run marginal cost level per model. I approximate the optimal
subsidy level to the dierence of the average marginal cost and the average long-run level in
each year.
I compute new equilibrium of the automobile market with the optimal production sub-
sidy, using the demand equation (3) and the supply equation (6). In equilibrium, because
restriction and tari are not used as the instrument for protection, Japanese makers compete
against foreign makers.
Under that circumstance, I compute yearly sales quantities, marginal costs and prices,
and repeat this computation process with the optimal subsidy rule, ct    c, until the end of
protection, 1965.
Table 3 presents the results of the simulation exercise with the actual data.
Second and third column represents prices and sales quantities under the actual policy
environment. Fourth column shows if the optimal subsidy policy had have been taken price
would have been lower than the actual price. Fifth and sixth columns indicate if the optimal
production subsidy had been given to domestic automakers, sales quantities of domestic
makers would have outweigh the level of sales quantities in the actual environment. Thanks
16to the production subsidy Japanese makers can set their price lower in the counterfactual
environment than they did in the actual environment.
Table3 also shows if the optimal production subsidy had been given to domestic makers,
they could have been competitive enough and overwhelm foreign competitors. That is, the
optimal production subsidy policy would induce the higher level of the domestic produc-
tion than the actual policy could, even with the existence of competition against import
passenger's cars.
5.3 Welfare Analysis
The previous section shows that sales level would have been rather higher if the optimal
policy had been taken. Here, I explore how consumer's and domestic producer's welfare
would have been changed if the optimal policy had been used instead of the actual policy.
5.3.1 Consumer's Surplus
Following Nevo (2001) or Trajtenberg (1990), I calculate consumer's surplus from demand
estimates. Consumer's surplus is the utility in terms of money that consumer receives from
purchasing a product. Consumer chooses the product, which gives the highest utility. There-
fore, consumer's surplus is described as
CSit =
1
it
maxj(Vjt + jt 8j);
where
Vjt = log(yit   pjt) + xjt + jt +
X
k
kviktxk:
The marginal utility of income, it, represents the conversion between utility and money. In
a logit model, which means  following i.i.d extreme value distribution, if the marginal utility
of income is constant for each individual, then Williams (1977), McFadden (1981) and Small
17and Rosen (1981) shows that consumer's surplus for individual i becomes
CSit =
ln(
PJ
j=0 eVijt)
it
; (9)
where it is the interaction term between consumer i's income and demand estimate . 12
The mean concumer's surplus is given by
M
Z
CSidP(D)dP(v);
where M is the potential size of the market and P(D) and P(v) are empirical and parametric
distribution functions respectively.
I also use compensating variation to measure the change of consumer's welfare from the
counterfactual environment. For the benchmark I use the consumer's surplus attained from
the optimal policy, where consumers can purchase both domestic cars and imports. This
case, compensating variation can be expressed by
CVit =
ln(
PJ
j=0 eVijt)actual   ln(
PJopt
j=0 eVijt)optimal
it
; (10)
where Jopt indicates the sum of the number of domestic models and import models.
Table 4 shows consumer's surplus and compensating variation in both environments.
Second column represents consumers surplus per individual consumer in the actual policy
and third is consumers surplus in the optimal situation. Forth column indicates per consumer
compensating variation and fth represents total compensating variation weighted by sales
quantities in each year.
Table.2 shows the actual level of consumer's surplus are smaller than the level of the
counterfactual environment. This gap is caused by two factors. First, under the optimal
policy consumers can gain the benet from the lower price than under the reality. Second,
in the counterfactual environment they can face the wider variety of automobiles than they
12I omit an unknown constant term which represents the fact that the absolute level of utility cannot be
measured.
18Table 4: Consumer's surplus and Compensating variation (10000 yen)
year actual CS optimal CS CV total CV
1955 0.030691 0.28558 -0.25489 -525.823
1956 0.037417 0.30107 -0.26365 -1185.2
1957 0.075158 0.39695 -0.32179 -2380.91
1958 0.059251 0.40641 -0.34716 -3654.72
1959 0.12701 0.68439 -0.55738 -9164.11
1960 0.50787 1.322 -0.81413 -26593.9
1961 0.81893 1.9462 -1.12727 -60610.2
1962 1.5277 3.1195 -1.5918 -148590
1963 1.7323 2.9211 -1.1888 -165445
1964 3.1344 4.9708 -1.8364 -364286
1965 3.7348 5.3338 -1.599 -466600
Total -1249036
did in the actual environment. The larger consumer's surplus re
ects these two factors in
the counterfactual environment.
5.3.2 Producer's Surplus
In addition to the welfare analysis on the demand side, producers' welfare is considered. I
calculate producers' surplus using prices and estimated marginal costs of each model in each
year in both environments.
Table 5 presents the result. Second and third columns represent producer's surplus under
the actual and counterfactual policy environment. Fourth column indicates the change of
producer's surplus. Similar to consumers, producers would have been also well-o. If the
Japanese government had have provided Japanese makers production subsidy properly, they
would have produce their products at the lower level of marginal costs. The lower level of
marginal costs would help automakers to set their prices at lower level than they did in fact.
The lower prices would induce more consumers to purchase their products. Therefore, the
optimal subsidy policy would help Japanese makers to gain more prots than the actual
protection did.
19Table 5: Producer's surplus (100000 yen)
year actual PS optimal PS PS change
1955 13527.32 22415 -8887.68
1956 30004.98 49911 -19906
1957 56372.25 88217 -31844.8
1958 66138.58 138190 -72051.4
1959 107036.4 220900 -113864
1960 235804.6 393360 -157555
1961 408130.8 596960 -188829
1962 481814 888660 -406846
1963 687838.7 1142100 -454261
1964 1008924 1539700 -530776
1965 1306682 1960100 -653418
total -2638240
Table 6: Total welfare change (100000 yen)
Total CV Total PS change Welfare change
-1249036 -2638240 -3887276
5.3.3 Total Welfare
In the previous analysis, I found both consumer's and producer's surplus would have outweigh
what was attained in the actual environment if the government had have taken the optimal
policy. Here I represent the total welfare change from the optimal policy for the protection
period. Table 6 indicates the result.
I also represent the result where I measure the actual welfare in terms of the optimal
welfare. Table 7 indicates the actual policy reached to about 55 percent of what the 
exible
subsidy policy could attain. However, consumers attained only 30 percent of what they could
have gained if protection policy were managed optimally. On the other hand, producers could
obtain about 60 percent of what they can obtain in the optimal environment.
This results shows that the distortion on consumption side was signicant because Japanese
consumers had to buy domestic products at higher prices. In addition, their choice set were
limited within domestic products by restriction. The result also shows that relative to pro-
ducers, consumers were more harmed.
20Table 7: Rate of Consumer, Producer and Total Welfare
CSactual=CSoptimal PSactual=PSoptimal TWactual=TWoptimal
0.278686 0.625277 0.55686
6 Conclusion and Extensions
The role of the governmental intervention is the center of the interest of policy makers and
researchers. To grow their domestic industry, policy makers often use industrial and trade
policies as instruments. Many have argued the protection policy contributed greatly to
the growth of Japanese automobile industry. Further, the policy has been said to be the
only example of the success of import restriction policy. Unfortunately, however, there is
little empirical evidence on the eect of industrial policies on an industry growth and its
welfare consequences. In this paper, I explore what would have happened to the growth
of the Japanese automobile industry and welfare if the protection policy had have been
implemented by the optimal subsidy policy. The results show that although the Japanese
policy has seemed to be the successful one, it could achieve the only half of the welfare level
under the optimal policy. Particularly, due to a severe import restriction, the distortion
on consumption was relatively large. In comparison with counterfactual optimal policy, the
actual import restriction reached to about 55 percent of welfare level.
Although I found that there was the large welfare loss, my counterfactual analysis depends
on some assumptions. First, in the experiment the product mix of domestic and the number
of foreign makers in the market are assumed unchanged. However, if the policy environment
had have changed, their behaviors would have been aected by the policy and they would
have altered their product mix or the entry/exit behaviors in response to the environmental
change. Therefore, I have to add my analysis to the rule of the entry/exit decisions. Second, I
analyzed Japanese automakers in a static equilibrium environment. Clearly, the richer model
which includes dynamic price setting behaviors have to be introduced. These assumptions
21used in this study may cause a serious problem for the results. Therefore, in future work I
have to deal with Japanese automobile industry using a dynamic oligopoly framework.
22Appendix: Data
The data set used in this study is from 1955 to 1965 on a year basis. Estimating a dif-
ferentiated product demand requires data on quantities sold (market share), prices, and
characteristics in each year. Characteristics variables include automobile size, Size, horse
power by weight, HP/W, size of engine, CC, and years passed after release year, Model
Age. Also, the information of the distribution of demographics (income) is required in the
estimation of a random coecient logit model. Automodile's data, quantities, prices, and
characteristics, are obtained from Automobile Yearbook and the automobile magazine, Mo-
tor Fan. Unfortunatelly, I couldn't nd the data of these before 1954. Japanese government
started its protection policy in 1951. I concern the lackness of data during 1951-1954 might
aect the results.
In the counterfactual exercise, I also use tha data on import cars. The imformation
of prices, characteristics of imports also are obtained from Automobile Year Book and the
magazine, Motor Fan. However, these price data include a tari. Therefore, I subtract
a tari (30 percent) from imports prices and use prices without a tari in counterfactual
exercise.
The income distribution are obtained from the Household Survey Data. I use that data
to construct the empirical distribution of income.
23Table A1: Summary statistics (Japanese automobiles)
Year No of models Price Size HP/W CC Model age New Small
1955 6 9.7233 9.8739 3.7793 12.547 1 0.16667 0
1956 6 9.0346 9.8739 3.7793 12.547 2 0.16667 0
1957 6 7.8949 9.809 4.127 12.547 3 0.16667 0
1958 6 7.4353 9.3935 3.9597 11.735 3.5 0.16667 0
1959 7 8.0536 9.7472 4.5524 12.719 4 0 0
1960 11 6.3256 8.6614 4.9286 10.823 3.0909 0.090909 0.27273
1961 13 5.2947 8.0595 5.0717 9.9115 3.1538 0.30769 0.30769
1962 17 4.8423 7.9152 5.0791 9.8181 3.3125 0.1875 0.3125
1963 19 4.4453 7.6991 5.5288 9.8035 3.1176 0.17647 0.29412
1964 23 4.3869 7.7212 6.0447 10.446 3.3478 0 0.21739
1965 21 4.285 7.9844 6.2539 11.149 4.3333 0 0.19048
All 132 5.6307 8.3695 5.2386 10.843 3.2879 0.11364 0.19697
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